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Potential Impact of EITC Adjustments
on Financial Self-Sufficiency
among Low-Income Families:
A Simulation Model

YOUNGHEE Lim
CATHERINE LEMIEUX

Louisiana State University

Policies that help low-income mothersfind and keep employment as
a means of obtaining self-sufficiency have been a focal point of the
welfare reform debate in the past decade. In the midst of this dialogue, the EarnedIncome Tax Credit (EITC) has gained popularity
as one of the core work support programsfor America's low- and
moderately low-incomefamilies with children. This study compares
the estimated effects of EITC when its value deterioratedin the late
1990s with that of a simulated EITCfor which the real value kept
pace with the actual cost of living on welfare caseload reductions.
Results indicate that the simulated EITC model showed a significantly greaterimpact on promotingfinancialself-sufficiency among
low-incomefamilies. Policy and practiceimplicationsfor strengthening the purchasing power of the EITC conclude this article.
Key words: Earned Income Tax Credit, cost-of-living, low-income
working families, families with children,financial self-sufficiency
Over the past decade the focus of welfare policies has
shifted from providing a social safety net to providing conditional and transitional support to families with children
Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare, June 2008, Volume XXXV, Number 2
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headed by single mothers. This shift in focus started gradually in the 1980s when the federal government began waiving
some program requirements governing Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC), thus allowing states to run their
own welfare programs to reduce burgeoning welfare caseloads.
This change process swiftly overhauled the welfare system in
the U.S. in the 1990s when former president Clinton signed the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) into law in 1996. PRWORA replaced AFDC
with Temporary Aid to Needy families (TANF), a policy that
discontinued entitlement programs to poor families, and
capped funding at the 1994 level of state spending on financial
assistance for eligible residents of those states.
In response to both the growing number of single mothers
receiving AFDC benefits and to the heightening negative sentiment of the public toward public assistance, states implemented a new set of welfare rules whose primary goal was
to increase the participation of those on welfare in the workforce through work incentives. Between 1994 and 2000 new
and stricter welfare eligibility and program rules were implemented. At the core of the overall work support package is the
federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC), a cash benefit paid
to low-income working families through the tax system. Lowincome families with positive labor earnings are eligible for the
EITC, a refundable tax credit. Previous research shows that the
federal EITC, along with other work-enforcing policies, significantly reduced welfare caseloads during the years following its
widespread expansion in the 1990s (Lim, 2008,2006). However,
the real value of the federal EITC for low-income working
families has actually deteriorated since 1998 and through 2000,
the period of observation for this current study. This current
research extends the primary author's (2008) previous work,
which estimated the effect of the fully phased-in federal EITC
and state supplemental EITCs on welfare caseload reductions
between 1994 and 2000. That investigation controlled for the
influence of AFDC waivers and TANF implementation; macroeconomic, demographic and political factors; and other statespecific and time-specific unobservables. Using the same data
set, this current study estimates the effects of EITC on welfare
caseload reductions for the time period during which its value
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actually deteriorated (after 1997) between 1998 and 2000. These
latter estimated effects are then compared to the effects of a
simulated EITC for the same three years, using a hypothetical
model that retains the real value of the EITC by keeping pace
with the actual cost of living. The purpose of this present study
is to provide empirical evidence for policymakers who are in
a position to annually modify and adjust the federal EITC to
ensure that it viably subsidizes the income of the working poor
while simultaneously retaining their participation in the labor
force.
Review of Literature
The FederalEITC: Definition and History
The federal EITC provides a cash benefit to low-income
working families through the tax system. To receive the EITC
benefit, a family must have positive labor earnings and total
income less than a specified threshold, and they must file for
the credit. The size of the credit depends on the number of children in the family. The family receives a refund if the tax credit
exceeds the tax the family would otherwise owe.
The EITC schedule consisted of three ranges in 2000. If a
family had no earnings from labor, then it received no credit.
In the phase-in range, the EITC acted as a wage subsidy; that
is, as the family's earnings increased, the credit amount also increased. In the stationary or plateau range, the family received
a maximum credit amount, regardless of earnings. In the phaseout range, the EITC performed similarly to a negative income
tax as the family earnings continued to increase. Then, finally,
if the family earnings exceeded the specified ceiling, the family
received no credit.
The EITC was first enacted in 1975 as a means of offsetting the tax burden to low-wage taxpayers with children, by
providing these taxpayers with relief from the Social Security
payroll tax (Hoffman & Seidman, 1990; Scholz, 1993) and enhancing incentives to work (Childman, 1995). When enacted
in 1975, the EITC parameter was 10% of the first $4,000 of
earned income and was phased out at a rate of 10 cents per
dollar of earnings or Adjusted Gross Income (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1996). Over time, changes in legislation have
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adjusted the income range affecting EITC eligibility and
maximum credit amounts. With the Tax Reform Act (TRA)
of 1986, the EITC became an integral component of national
anti-poverty efforts. With the passage of the TRA, the dollar
amount of the EITC was indexed for inflation (U.S. House of
Representatives, 1996), and, as a result, nearly offset all of the
erosion that occurred between 1975 and 1984. It is important
to note that the actual value of the EITC's maximum credit, in
real terms, had eroded by 35% (Steuerle & Wilson, 1987). By
adjusting the EITC, the 1986 TRA eliminated the tax burden
for more than six million impoverished Americans who were
facing deteriorating wages and continued poverty (Conlan,
Wrightson, & Beam, 1988).
EITC Expansions in the 1990s
The TRA of 1986 restored the original value of the EITC,
subsequently reducing the tax burden on low-income families. However, a more substantial expansion of the credit
was implemented with the passage of the Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1990 and 1993. OBRA 1990 substantially increased the maximum credit and also began differentiating between families with only one child and families
with two or more. The Clinton administration placed the EITC
at the center of its plan to make work a more attractive alternative than welfare, and additional changes were enacted in
1993. The 1993 bill extended the credit to childless, low-income
working adults (Ventry, 2000), although the credit amount was
minimal. The rate remained constant for seven consecutive
years (U.S. House of Representatives, 2000). In 1996, when
OBRA was fully phased in, taxpayers with two or more qualifying children could claim a credit of 40% of their earnings
up to $8,890, resulting in a maximum credit of $3,356. This
maximum credit amount was available to those with earnings between $8,890 and $11,610. The credit benefit began to
phase out at a rate of 21.06% of earnings above $11,610. The
credit was incrementally and ultimately phased out when
earnings reached $28,495 (U.S. House of Representatives).
Thus, between 1984 and 1996 the total annual EITC amount in
nominal dollars received by low-income families with children
increased tenfold (U.S. House of Representatives). By 1996, the
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EITC had become the largest means-tested transfer program
for low-income working families with children (Phillips, 2001).
Total EITC spending per family alone ($31,900) in 1999 exceeded the combined amounts spent on TANF ($13,449) and food
stamps ($15,766). [See Scholz and Levine (2002) for complete
data.]
Expansion of the EITC program not only substantially
offset the costs of Social Security taxes, but also offered an alternative approach to families living in poverty which demonstrated a commitment to participation in the labor market. As
Scholz (1993) aptly observed, the fact that the EITC program
has successfully provided income supplements to poor families without undermining work incentives undeniably justifies
retaining EITCs in the anti-poverty legislation tool kit. What
distinguishes the EITC from traditional welfare programs is
that a person is expected to work in order to be eligible for the
credit. It should be noted, however, that the EITC program is
similar to other welfare programs in several ways. First and
foremost, it is a means-tested program that seeks to change
the work behaviors of potential or current recipients of the
benefit (from underemployment or unemployment to gainful
employment). Families may become ineligible for the credit
as they steadily work and increase their earnings, well before
they are financially self-sufficient. Further, families may resent
being taxed (while the government is making a payment) on
their additional earnings in the phase-out range due to its relatively higher marginal tax rate, which results in increasing
net gain at a decreasing rate when compared with the rates by
which net gains increase for families during the EITC phase-in
period. Nevertheless, unlike previous welfare programs, the
EITC unequivocally promotes employment for three reasons:
(a) the credit increases with the workers' earnings during the
phase-in period; (b) the credit rate decreases much less rapidly
than typical welfare benefits during the phase-out period; and
(c) the income level at phase out is much higher than that of
TANF.
Previous EITC Research
A large body of literature describes the EITC (DickertColin, Fitzpatrick, & Hanson, 2005; Phillips, 2001), and
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describes its impact on various employment and income outcomes among single mothers (Blank, Card, & Robbins, 1999;
Ellwood, 2000; Eissa & Liebman, 1996; Meyer & Rosenbaum,
2001), changes in welfare caseloads (Acs, Phillips, & Nelson,
2003; Council of Economic Advisors [CEA], 1999; Fender,
McKernan, & Bernstein, 2002; Grogger, 2003), and poverty
in households with children (e.g., Blank, 2002; Caputo, 2006;
Johnson, Llobrera, & Zahradnik, 2003).
Researchers who have conducted welfare caseload studies
using theoretical modeling (Acs et al., 2003; Fender et al.,
2002) and quantitative empirical methods (Blank, 2002; CEA,
1999; Grogger, 2003; Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, & Connelly, 2000)
have identified several factors that historically have contributed to welfare caseload reductions, such as lengthy and
robust economic expansion, welfare policy changes, and other
work-support programs, among which the EITC consistently
emerges as a significant explanatory predictor. Results are consistent across the above-mentioned studies, regardless of the
type of data used (i.e., micro data, administrative data, preand post-1996 data, and yearly and monthly data). However,
because concepts were inconsistently operationalized in this
body of research, estimates of the relative importance of factors
used in the different models vary considerably across studies.
Nevertheless, as a whole, studies show that the EITC has increased employment among families headed by single mothers
(Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001) and that it reduces poverty by
providing work incentives to low-income families headed by
single mothers with children, the population historically most
prone to welfare dependency (Blank, 2002; Eissa & Liebman,
1996). In fact, single women with children are the largest group
of workers eligible for the EITC, and families headed by single
mothers comprise nearly 50% of the EITC-eligible population.
It is estimated that three fourths of those eligible have participated in the EITC program during the 1990s (Dickert-Conlin
et al., 2005).
According to Blank (2002), the sharpest increase in employment during the mid-1990s was found among lowerskilled single mothers with young children. Further, Meyer
and Rosenbaum (2001) estimated that federal EITC expansions alone explained an approximate 60% increase in
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employment during the 12-year time period between 1984 and
1996. Grogger (2003) similarly found that EITC expansions
during the 1990s were the single most important policy change
that contributed to reductions in welfare use via increased
employment and earnings among single mothers. However,
Grogger (2003) may have overestimated the true effects of the
EITC on welfare use because he neither considered the circumstances of those who remained ineligible for welfare benefits
nor controlled for other influential work-related welfare and
non-welfare policies.
Despite substantial theoretical and empirical evidence that
the EITC is significantly linked to increased employment and
income, there is no current research that examines the largest
and most recent expansions of the EITC program on welfare
caseload reduction. Further, no study has examined how the
continued erosion of this credit between 1998 and 2000 has
impacted poor, working families. For example, the maximum
EITC credit was $3,756 in 1998, but decreased to $3,734 (in 1998
dollars) in 1999 and then further decreased to $3,680 (in 1998
dollars) in 2000. This current study estimates the impact of
recent expansions of the EITC program on welfare caseload
reductions and then compares these latter estimates with those
of a simulated model in which the EITC is hypothetically and
fully indexed to the cost of living for the years 1998, 1999, and
2000.
Method
ConceptualFramework
This study, which extends the primary author's (2006)
previous research, employs a pooled time-series, fixed-effects
model with welfare caseloads serving as the dependent variable. Federal and state EITCs, welfare policy, and demographic, economic, and political variables comprise the independent
variables. Consistent with the author's previous work, the
model for this current study uses the following natural logarithm form by:
In yit = Oti + P1 * EITC,,

+ P2

*

Xi t

8t
+

Tit
+ + 8it
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The dependent variable is yit, which is welfare caseloads measured for state i in year t. The intercept ot is the individual state
effect, which is taken to be constant over time. EITC is the
Earned Income Tax Credit variable; x is a vector of other explanatory variables (e.g., demographic, economic, welfare, and
political variables); bt is time effect (constant across states); -i, is
the state-specific time trends (the interaction of state dummies
and the linear time trend variables); [ is a vector of coefficients;
and si is the cross-section, time-series error component, which
represents the effects of omitted variables specific to the state
in a given time period.
Welfare caseload data were compiled from 50 states and
the District of Columbia. Thus, 51 panels of annual, aggregatelevel data, for the seven-year time period from 1994 through
2000 were available for analysis. (See Lim [2008] for a fuller
description of data sources and variables.) Mathematical computations rather than statistical procedures were performed to
calculate the subsidy rate for the years during which real value
of the EITC deteriorated (1998, 1999, and 2000).
EITC Simulation Measures
A basic model (Model A) is adapted from the primary author's (2008) research to this current EITC simulation study.The
dependent variable, AFDC and TANF aggregate caseload data
by state in each year, was defined as the natural log of the ratio
of the number of recipients to the number of females between
the ages of 15 and 44. The independent variables include the
federal EITC and state EITCs, welfare policy changes, unemployment, political environment, and educational attainment.
The EITC phase-in subsidy rate is a key parameter of the
federal EITC used and state EITC is coded as a dummy variable
for each year in the state in which it is implemented. Welfare
policy changes during two distinct time periods were dummy
coded in each state for the year observed: one to capture the
period during which any major waiver was in effect and one
to capture the period during which TANF was in effect. AFDC
and TANF maximum monthly benefits for a family of three
for each state and year are defined in the natural log form.
The unemployment rate is used to measure the effect of macroeconomic performance on welfare caseloads. Three political
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variables that capture the effect of political influences on
welfare caseloads are measured as dummy variables (Blank,
2001) and are entered and tested simultaneously. If the governor of a state was a Democrat, if the majority of both state
Houses and Senates was Republican, and if the majority of
both state Houses and Senates was Democrat, a 1 was assigned
to each condition, respectively. Educational attainment is measured as the proportion of people over 25 years of age who
completed high school.
In sum, this study builds upon the primary author's (2008)
previous research that used administrative data for the years
1994 through 2000. This current study incorporates a simulated
model to compare the eroded phase-in rate (in real dollar terms)
of the EITC on welfare caseload reduction with a phase-in rate
that is hypothetically indexed to the cost of living for the years
1998, 1999, and 2000. The present study hypothetically indexes
the EITC phase-in rate to the cost of living while controlling
for (a) maximum monthly benefits; (b) the minimum wage; (c)
economic, political, and educational factors; (d) AFDC waivers;
and (e) TANF implementation.
Results
Mathematical Computations of the EITC Subsidy Rate
The EITC subsidy rate for families with multiple children
has increased to 40% of the family's earned income since 1996,
and, in nominal dollars, a family with multiple children could
receive the EITC maximum credit of $3,556 in 1996. However,
the EITC maximum credit amount a family with two or more
children could receive in 1996 was $3,694 (in 1998 dollars). This
maximum credit actually increased to $3,756 in 1998, but decreased to $3,734 (in 1998 dollars) in 1999. This credit amount
further decreased to $3,680 (in 1998 dollars) in 2000. If the credit
level had been kept to at least the 1998 level, the maximum
credit in 1999 would have been $3,839 instead of $3,816, in
nominal dollars. This means that the phase-in subsidy rate of
the federal EITC concomitantly should have increased from
40.00% to 40.42% between 1998 and 1999 for families with multiple children. Further, the phase-in rate of the EITC should
have increased to 41.56% in 2000 in order to prevent erosion of
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Table 1. Comparison of Effects of the EITC and Simulated EITC on
the Welfare Caseloads

Federal EITC phase-in rate

Current
EITC
-0.012"**
(0.01)
(0.001)

Simulated
EITC
-0.016**
(0.01)
(0.001)

Adoption of state EITC

-0.242***
(0.008)

-0.238***
(0.010)

Log (Maximum welfare benefits)

0.185**
(0.091)

0.372**
(0.165)

Log (Monthly minimum wage)

-2.252***
(0.180)

-2.393***
(0.071)

Unemployment rate

0.136***
(0.006)

0.080***
(0.030)

Republican governor

(0.009)

(0.025)

Both State Senate & House Republican

(0.051"**
(0.013)

-0.075)
(0.013)

Both State Senate & House Democrat

0.007
0.011
(0.011)

0.024
0.065
(0.065)

Percent with high school diploma

-0.017"**
(0.002)

-0.008***
(0.002)

Any major AFDC waiver implementation

-0.064
(0.069)

-0.036
(0.068)

TANF implementation

-0.169***
(0.016)

-0.097***
(0.034)

Variable

State-Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

Time-Fixed Effects

Yes

Yes

0.997

0.997

8113.95

10510.16

R-Square
F-Statistics
Note. N = 357 (51 states from 1994-2000).
*p <0.10. ** p <0.05. ***p < 0.01.
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the real dollars of the EITC maximum credit.
Simulated EITC Model
Table 1, column 2 presents the estimated coefficients of the
variables from the simulated model, which was performed to
estimate the effect of the EITC phase-in subsidy rate on welfare
caseload reductions, assuming that this rate remained constant,
rather than deteriorated in real value, at the 1998 benefit level.
As seen in Table 1, the results from the model that includes
the simulated EITC phase-in subsidy rate show the larger coefficient of -0.016 in Column 2, as compared to the coefficient
-0.012 in Column 1 of the current EITC. This means that a 1%
increase in the EITC subsidy rate resulted in a 1.2% decrease
in welfare caseloads with the EITC value eroded. This same increase in the EITC subsidy rate (1%) would have resulted in a
1.6% decrease in welfare caseload if the EITC subsidy rate had
not eroded and had kept pace with the actual, current cost of
living. (Readers interested in a full description of the relative
impact of other variables on welfare caseload reduction listed
in Table 1 are referred to the primary author's 2008 study.)
Discussion
This study estimated the impact of the EITC on reduction
of welfare caseloads by comparing the estimated effects with
those obtained using a simulated model in which the real dollar
value of EITC benefits was maintained at the 1998 level, thereby
preventing erosion of the benefit due to inflation. Results show
that the EITC would have had a larger impact on the decline
in welfare caseloads had it kept pace with the cost of living
during the years 1998, 1999, and 2000. In the hypothetical
model, a 1.0% increase in the EITC subsidy rate was associated
with a 1.6% percent decrease in welfare caseload. In more practical terms, the federal EITC would have been instrumental in
rendering approximately 722,525 people ineligible for welfare
benefits in any given year from 1994 through 2000, holding all
other factors constant. This suggests that had the EITC amount
been sustained to prevent erosion of its purchasing power, the
EITC could have been even more effective in moving a greater
number of families toward financial self-sufficiency. It is useful
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to note that, in this study, "financial self-sufficiency" is defined
as moving off of welfare or leaving public assistance as defined
in Caputo's (1997) earlier study.
It is important to note that a limitation of this study is the
use of administrative data, which precludes consideration
of the circumstances of those who are removed from welfare
caseloads and those who remain ineligible for benefits. This
piece of information is an important factor when assessing
the strength of work support programs, in light of the fact
that many families ineligible for welfare benefits continue
to receive other means-tested benefits, such as food stamps,
Supplemental Security Income, and housing and child care
subsidies, whether they are working or not (Besharov, 2006;
Danziger & Seefeldt, 2000).
This current study makes an important contribution to
knowledge about the EITC and outcomes of welfare reform
efforts. This study presents compelling evidence that the EITC
supports poor people who are committed to work and to receiving employment earnings. As many states further restrict
eligibility for welfare benefits by imposing work requirements
and by providing time-limited aid to their most destitute population, the findings of this study underscore the importance
of federal- and state-level governmental accountability for
strengthening a holistic work support approach that benefits
those whose goal is to achieve financial self-sufficiency. This
study also emphasizes the importance of continually adjusting
EITC amounts to keep pace with the cost of living. Without
adjusting for the effects of inflation, the EITC cannot viably
provide wage subsidies of sufficient real-dollar value. Indeed,
a more generous subsidy rate would increase the proportion
of low-income families whose poverty is alleviated as they
move toward greater financial self-sufficiency. If the real value
of the EITC continues to erode, as it did during the time period
between 1975 and 1985, then the EITC will lose its effectiveness
as a viable component of the anti-poverty armamentarium.
If this trajectory remains unaltered, then the EITC likely will
suffer the fate of its welfare policy predecessors, AFDC and
TANE And, of course, the real victims of policy implementation failure are the children living in families whose income
needs are never sufficiently met.
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Future research should study the effects of changes in
subsidy rates in relation to labor behavior using micro data,
while controlling for economic and non-economic variables.
Changes in family members' work behaviors intuitively
would vary according to how EITCs are perceived. In other
words, whether prospective EITC users see EITCs as a reward
or a penalty depends upon how knowledgeable they are about
how EITCs work. From a more practical standpoint, however,
their perceptions of any benefit are inextricably linked to their
experiences of financial need and their daily challenges with
material hardship. For many families who struggle to make
ends meet, it may not be realistic for them to forego traditional
benefits during the months they need income, even though
they intellectually understand the potential benefits of receiving a higher lump-sum payment from the EITC at the beginning of the subsequent calendar year.
More recently, the Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001 removed the marriage penalty
for many couples and their families by increasing beginning
and ending amounts of the phase-out ranges for married
taxpayers who file a joint return (Seidman & Hoffman, n.d.).
However, this policy has little effect on low-income, working
families who are absolutely poor and who cycle in and out of
the welfare infrastructure, facing temporary but frequent ups
and downs. This brings us back to the most critical issue that
the EITC is but one complementary program that comprises
a holistic network of anti-poverty and family-strengthening
social welfare policies and programs. The EITC cannot and
should not replace a financial safety net for those who either
cannot work or should not be expected to participate in the
labor market, including single mothers with few work support
resources who are rearing young children. Although married
mothers with younger children are not forced into the labor
market by societal norms, the same cannot be said of single
mothers, whose work and marital choices have been the target
of behavioral modification via punitive welfare reforms. A relatively sluggish reduction in child poverty while welfare caseloads plummet and income gaps widen (despite widespread,
full-time, employment among single mothers) reflects the need
for a far more comprehensive approach to addressing issues
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of welfare dependency, child poverty, and work and marital
choices among low-income single mothers.
With the devolution of responsibility for social welfare programs from the federal government to the states, it is timely
for social workers to begin assisting state and local policymakers with clarifying and carrying out their new responsibilities
more effectively. In terms of direct practice, workers employed
in social service agencies that provide financial counseling
should pay closer attention to the tax-filing histories and selfemployment behaviors of their EITC-eligible clients. Such
persons should be educated about their eligibility for the
EITC. Self-employed clients should be provided with information about the economic advantages of filing for the credit.
In order for practitioners to competently assist low-income
families, social workers must be educated about EITCs and,
when applicable, about how such programs are administered
and implemented in their respective states. This is consistent
with recommendations for schools of social work to include
contemporary policy practice issues in their policy curricula
(Rocha & Johnson, 1997), as well as to highlight policy practice
approaches that concretely link social work with social policy
(Weiss, Gal, & Katan, 2006).
At the present time, few low-income families receive traditional welfare benefits when they are not working. Thus,
an appropriate focus for social workers and policymakers is
working families in poverty (a) who no longer receive welfare
benefits, (b) who have gained financial self-sufficiency, (c) who
have not sought benefits (despite their eligibility), and (d) who
have never been eligible for welfare benefits (Pear & Eckholm,
2006). However, bolstering EITCs at the federal and state level
is not enough. Efforts to enhance the actual benefits of EITCs
should go hand in hand with raising the minimum wage,
creating more and better paying jobs, and enacting equitable
tax and other policies that support families at work and with
child-rearing (Clinton, 2006). This study shows that strengthening the EITC is an effective approach for not only supporting single mothers but also for enabling low-wage workers to
earn more. This present study of the potential benefits of an
adjusted EITC contributes to a growing body of scholarship
that argues for the development and testing of progressive and
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socially responsible approaches to facilitate real-life, sustainable changes for children in poverty and the working poor.
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